Update, Nov 12 evening. Huntress now says the way in was an authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32. The extension checks a shared access key instead of normal ScreenConnect logins, and if an admin never set that key it stayed blank, so an attacker could send an empty key and run commands with no login and no MFA (multifactor authentication). ConnectWise has disabled five possibly related third-party extensions across about 400 partner environments. Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber also took apart the attackers' toolkit, called SCKit: 16 scripts that plant extra ScreenConnect clients for persistence, then try to flip a support session around. A piece called RelayTrap replaces the Guest process on an infected machine and, when a technician connects, tries to push a file back to the technician's computer using CVE-2026-84869, then steal their ScreenConnect session cookies and spread through the Shared Toolbox to other customers. Both firms say that worm step failed everywhere they looked, and Blackpoint confirmed the existing 26.6.5 fix blocks it. What to do: disable RMM+ and similar extensions, set or rotate any extension access keys, and make sure technician clients are on 26.6.5 or later. Source: BleepingComputer.
Update, Nov 12. Huntress now counts 288 endpoints across 48 organizations hit within 90 minutes. Late on Nov 11, ConnectWise said it believes the activity comes from abuse of RMM+, an independently developed ScreenConnect extension that exposes an API able to run remote commands, protected by a passphrase the partner sets. ConnectWise found about 400 partner environments with an RMM+ extension installed (it says presence alone does not mean compromise), disabled it in those cloud environments, and told on-premises customers to disable it themselves. It warned that disabling extensions and resetting credentials may not remove software or persistence already on endpoints. Blackpoint Cyber told The Record the attackers' toolkit exploits CVE-2026-84869 and that the existing patch blocks it, but the toolkit can also hijack logged-in technician sessions. Huntress says it has not seen a new vulnerability and initial access still points to stolen credentials or hijacked sessions. Source: The Record.
What happened. Huntress's SOC flagged an active campaign against cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances that it says started around 17:47 UTC (12:47 PM ET) on Nov 11. As of its first public update it was tracking six compromised MSPs and 286+ endpoints across 47 organizations, with numbers climbing. ConnectWise told BleepingComputer it is aware of malicious activity affecting "a limited number of ScreenConnect partners" and is investigating with Huntress.
How it works. Once inside an MSP's ScreenConnect tenant, the attacker uses the built-in Run Command feature to install a second, attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client on every managed endpoint. That gives them their own remote-access line into customer machines that survives even if the MSP locks down its own console. Huntress also warned of a possible reverse pivot: a technician's own workstation may get compromised when they open a session to an infected customer device. It is not yet clear whether that is a software bug or abuse of normal features, and Huntress has not confirmed initial access, though its telemetry points to stolen credentials and hijacked support sessions. No CVE has been tied to the campaign so far.
Why this matters to an enterprise. One MSP console reaches dozens of customers at once, which is why remote-support tools are a favorite ransomware on-ramp. Huntress says the attacker's sequential tags suggest other MSPs were hit earlier, so a quiet console today is not proof you are clean. If an outside provider supports your endpoints through ScreenConnect, you are in scope even if you never bought the product yourself.
Do now. Review ScreenConnect Run Command history even without alerts, and hunt for rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091 and installer URLs ending in ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited. Do not open interactive sessions to suspect devices; investigate with separate tooling. Revoke active sessions, reset technician credentials from a clean device, and confirm MFA on every account. If you are an MSP customer, ask your provider today whether they run cloud ScreenConnect and what their Run Command logs show.
